ABSTRACT The use of modern technology for the Goodwell of human beings especially in medical science is a hot research area. Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) is very popular in health care services in developed countries where a physician can remotely get patients related information. The security of such information is very critical as its misuse can have adverse effects on the patients' life. The information transmitted over a public channel is protected using authentication protocols. For this purpose, various biometrics-based authentication protocols including Omid et al.'s protocol have been proposed. However, in this article, it has been analyzed that Omid et al.'s protocol is susceptible to user impersonation attack and also fails to protect user identity. Hence, to remedy the problems an improved mechanism is needed to secure the three-factor authentication framework for the practical application. Therefore, a robust and efficient biometrics-based authentication and key agreement protocols for E-Health Services has been proposed. Further, it has been shown through formal and informal analysis that the proposed scheme is provably secure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the recent advancement in telecommunication technology, its usage is at the peak in business as well as services industries like healthcare services. The extensive use of inexpensive mobile devices, make it easy to provide different services including healthcare services at the doorsteps. TMISs provide appropriate telecare services to different users at home. TMIS also allow doctors to remotely check up the patient's current condition. Since TMIS is used to share critical user-related information, therefore, securing is of critical importance.
In order to protect the patients' secrecy using secure authentication protocol between a server and patients/doctors, many scholars proposed three-factor user authentication schemes [1] - [7] . Previously introduced password and smartcard-based schemes were used for user authentication due to smart card dominance. However, information can be retrieved from the smart card by an adversary as indicated
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Junggab Son.
by Witteman [8] and Messerges et al. [9] . So, the security of many authentication protocols has been exposed [10] - [12] .
Wu et al. [13] in 2012, introduced an authentication protocol for TMIS using the smart-card. However, Debiao et al. [14] found that the protocol in [13] is exposed to insider and impersonation attacks if the smartcard of the user is either lost or stolen. Furthermore, they introduced an improved version of the scheme to remedy the security loopholes of Wu et al.'s protocol. Later on, Wei et al. [15] proved that if the smart-card is lost/stolen both He et al. [14] and Wu et al. [13] protocols are susceptible to offline password guessing attack if an adversary successfully extract the information from the smart-card. Therefore, a new protocol was proposed in [15] to address the weaknesses of both protocols. However, Zhu [16] argued that Wei et al. [15] proposal itself is exposed to offline password guessing attack where they proposed a new and improved scheme.
Considering the limitation of password-based authentication protocols using smart-card [13] , [17] - [20] many scholars presented three-factor authentication schemes [21] - [26] . The first proposal to discuss presented by Tan [23] where VOLUME 7, 2019 This the authors introduced a biometric-based three factor authentication protocol for TMIS. However, it was analyzed by Yan et al. [27] proving that this proposal is unable to resist DoS attack. The authors in [27] came up with their own proposal to remedy the problem in [23] . However, recently a new proposal came up from Omid and Nikooghadam [28] proving the exposure of Yan et al. [27] not only to impersonation, offline password guessing attacks but also non provisioning of forward secrecy. To address the weaknesses in protocol proposed in [27] , Omid et al. came up with a new proposal for secure authentication. However, after a detailed analysis of the protocol presented by Omid and Nikooghadam [28] it has been found that their proposal, in case of the lose of smartcard, is insecure against user impersonation attack. Moreover, the Omid et al. protocol is unable to secure user anonymity. Therefore, a robust and efficient scheme to counter the indicated flaw in Omid et al.'s scheme has been presented in this article. From now on the Omid et al. scheme will be referred to as the baseline scheme/protocol. Contribution of this article as list as follows:
• To perform detailed cryptanalysis of Omid et al. protocol to find out its security loopholes and weaknesses.
• To proposed an improved, robust and efficient authentication protocol which is resistant to various possible attacks.
• To verify the proposed protocol and the strength of its security using an automated tool.
• To perform an analysis of computation and communication cost has been performed to assess the computation and communication efficiency of the proposed protocol.
• To comparatively analyze the proposed protocol with existing state-of-the-art protocols to validate its performance. The comparison is based on security requirements, computation, and communication efficiency.
II. SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY PRIMITIVES
This section details the basic concepts and strengths of Symmetric encryption/decryption and hash functions
A. SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
The encryption based of symmetric cryptography can be defined by an algorithm SEN (..) with some key k ∈ {0, 1} * and real time message M ∈ {0, 1} * and results a corresponding cipher C ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}. Formally, C = SEN (k, M ) as an instance of execution of SEN with inputs k and M , whereas, SEN outputs C after execution.
B. SYMMETRIC DECRYPTION
The decryption can be defined by an algorithm SED with similar key k ∈ {0, 1} * used in SEN and cipher C ∈ {0, 1} * . SED results a corresponding real time message M ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}. Formally, M = SED(k, C) as an instance of execution of SED with inputs k and C, whereas, SED outputs M after execution.
The secure encryption/decryption algorithm based on symmetric cryptography qualifies following properties:
• Given C = SEN (k, M ), SED and SEN , it is computationally infeasible to compute M without knowledge of k. This property is called Confidentiality.
• Given M , C, SED and SEN , it is computationally infeasible to extract k This property is called resistance to known plain text and known cipher text.
C. HASH FUNCTIONS
A has function H : {0, 1} * → Z * q takes arbitrary length message M and generates a fixed length code H f = H (M ), where H f is called hash-code or hash-value. A slight change in M brings significant change in output (Avalanche effect). A hash function should posses following properties to qualify as secure:
effortless.
• Given H f = H (M ), computing M is computationally infeasible.
• Finding two messages M 1 and M 2 such that H (M 1 ) = H (M 2 ) is computationally infeasible. This property is termed as collision resistance.
III. REVIEW OF THE BASELINE PROTOCOL
A detailed review of the baseline protocol has been presented in this section. The protocol comprises of four phases: Registration phase, Login phase, Key agreement phase, Password and biometric change phase. Registration and Key agreement phases are explained in Fig. 1 . 
B. LOGIN PHASE
When the registration phase concludes, the user U i needs to execute the following steps to Login to the server S. 1: U i inserts his/her S c into card reader, enters his/her identity id ui and password pw ui and scan his/her biometric B * i . Now, the S c computes:
Generates r u1 ∈ Z * n (7)
Now U i transmits the request message
C. KEY AGREEMENT PHASE 2: At the arrival of the request message from the user U i , the server S verifies validity of its time stamp. If t 2 −t 1 > t, then it is a valid time stamp then S computes:
Now verifies H 1 ?
= h(id ui X D r u1 t 1 ) = H 1 , in case of failure the server S terminates the session otherwise, S generates a random number r s1 ∈ Z * n and calculates the following:
After computation S sends the message {m 2 , H 2 , t 3 } to user U i . 3: At the arrival of the message, the user U i verifies its freshness using the time stamp t 4 − t 3 > t and computes:
verifies
Now U i transmits {H 3 } to server S. 
IV. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
An identical adversarial model as mentioned in [9] , [29] - [32] has been adapted for the proposed protocol in this article with the following assumption:
1) The adversary A has unrestricted access to the public communication channel where A can replay and modify any message(s) as well as introduce a new message and can discard any message. 2) A can get the patient's private information like password or can steal his/her S c but not both at the same time. 3) A can retrieve the S c 's stored parameters as mentioned [9] , [32] .
V. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE BASELINE PROTOCOL
This section illustrates the weaknesses of baseline protocol. It has been shown that the baseline protocol is unable to provide user anonymity and also vulnerable to user Impersonation attack. For this purpose, an adversary A may act as a legal user and performs the steps as follows.
A. USER ANONYMITY VIOLATION ATTACK
This subsection analyzes the baseline protocol [28] and shows that it has been unable to provide user anonymity.
In the baseline protocol, the real identity of a user may be retrieved by another legitimate user of the system. It can be done by intercepting the Login request message that is normally transmitted over the insecure public communication channel.
Here a working example has been presented to clarify the logic behind the attack. Assume a legal user U j wants to find the identity of another user U i . To retrieve the real identity of the user U i , U j may perform the following steps.
1:
} from his/her own S c by using the methods mentioned in [9] , [32] . 2: Now U j by using his/her own id uj , pw uj , B j and N j computes pwd j = h(id uj pw uj B j N j ) and obtain the value
the server S over the public communication channel, U j intercepts the Login request as an eavesdropper. 4: Now by using the stolen smart card parameters he/she can compute
B. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
For impersonation of a legitimate user, an attacker A retrieves the parameters stored in stolen S c through power analysis mentioned in [9] , [32] . Then, an adversary using S c can easily masquerade legal user U i . The steps involved in the process are as follows: 1: A retrieves the concealed parameters stored in stolen S c . A also extract the real identity of a user as performed in section V-A. Now A by using his/her own identity id uj , password pw uj , biometric B j and N j can compute:
Now using C i from the stolen smart-card, A can compute:
Generate r u1 (25)
A transmits request message
Upon getting the message S computes:
Now S conveys the message {m 2 , H 2 , t 3 } to U 3: A computes by intercepting the message
A sends his own message {H 3 )} to S 4: At the arrival of the message, the server S may calculate a session key as sk = h(X i D id ui r s1 r u1 ) and verify the message H 3 = h(sk). Hence, A has successfully impersonate the user U i and already calculated a shared session key considered as legitimate key by S.
VI. PROPOSED SCHEME
Based on the baseline protocol presented in [28] , an enhance version has been introduced in this section consisting of three phases namely: registration, Login, and key agreement phases. Figure 2 shows the registration and key agreement phases of the proposed protocol.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE 1) To get registered, the user U i along with a random number N i also selects his/her identity id ui , and password pw ui . Now, computes pwd i = h(id ui pw ui N i B i ) and sends {id ui , pwd i } message using a secure channel to the server S. 2) At the arrival of the message, the server S generates a random number r s ∈ Z * n and computes
⊕ pwd i and uses smartcard to store the calculated values. Finally, uses a secure network to send the smartcard S c to the user. 3) Once the samrtcard arrives, the user U i also computes
and update these values into the S c . Now S c contains 
VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Proposed scheme.
VOLUME 7, 2019
Now verifies m i = m i are equal then id ui and pw ui are considered valid values otherwise, S c terminates the session. Furthermore, the smartcard S c generates a random number r u1 ∈ Z * n and calculates the following:
Now U i sends request message {(NID i , H 1 , G i , t 1 )} to S.
C. KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
2: At the arrival of the request message, the server S first verifies its freshness using the time stamps t c − t i = if it holds then computes the following:
= h(id ui X i t 1 r u1 ) if it does not hold, the S terminates the session otherwise, it generates random numbers r s1 , r s2 ∈ Z * n and computes:
Now S sends the message {(m 2 , H 2 , t 3 , NID new )} to U i . 3: On receiving the message U i checks the freshness of time stamps t 3 as t 4 − t 3 = t and calculates:
Now transmits the message {H 3 )} to S. 4: On receipt the S compute the session as sk s = h(X i id ui r s1 r u1 ) and checks the receiving parameter
In case of failure the session is terminated by U i while in case of success(true value) a shared session is key is calculated as sk = sk ui = sk s . This key is assumed to be the legitimate session key established between the user U i and the server S.
VII. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The proposed protocol must be analyzed to asses whether it is provably secure. This section presents a detailed analysis of the security and the performance of the proposed protocol. Security of the proposed system has been analyzed formally and informally whereas performance analysis has been performed using computation cost in terms of operation the number of operation executed as well as communication cost in terms of the messages(bits) exchanged during a single transaction of the protocol. Furthermore, the computation and communication cost has been compared to the existing protocol for validation. The analysis reveals that the proposed protocol is resistant to all known attacks as well as those attacks discussed in related protocols.
A. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
The proposed protocol has been informally analyzed in this subsection against various security attacks.
1) ANONYMITY AND PRIVACY
An authentication protocol must ensure anonymity and privacy of the information. Using the proposed protocol, even if an adversary A intercepts the request message
A is unable to derive the identity id ui of a user. The user identity id ui is encrypted with private key x s of the server that only known to the server. Therefore, it is impossible for A to extract id ui from a message intercepted over the public channel. Therefore, the proposed protocol is not only anonymous but also protects user privacy.
2) OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
For this attack to take place, the adversary A must have
} -the parameters stored in smartcard, and the request message {NID i , H 1 , G i , t i }. Even if the adversary A gets both, may be able to get the pwd i = NID i ⊕ C i . However, the password pw ui is still secured through a one-way hash function as in pwd i = h(id ui pw ui N i B i ) that makes it impossible for the attacker to revert it and compute the password. Therefore, the proposed scheme withstands password guessing attack.
3) RESIST REPLAY ATTACK
Any authentication protocol must protect against replay attack. In case of the proposed protocol, if an eavesdropper gets a hold of the request message {NID i , H 1 , G i , t 1 } and tries to replay it. At the arrival of each message, the server S checks its freshness using the time stamp t c − t i = .
If the time stamp is obsoleted, then S realizes that the message has been replayed and simply discard it. Furthermore, if A is able to generate a new time stamp t a and use it to replay the request message. Then the adversary A also needs the identity id ui , X i , r u1 as well as t 1 to successfully compute the H 1 . Due to the security provided by hash function, it is not possible for the adversary to extract those parameters. Even if A strives to replay the response message {m 2 , H 2 , NID new , t 2 } from S. Again in this case U i first checks the freshness of the time stamp as well as needs r s1 to compute the correct value of H 2 . However, deriving r u1 from H 1 is impossible due to the security of the hash function and only known to U i . Therefore, A fails to compute H 2 . Hence, the proposed scheme resists against replay attack. VOLUME 7, 2019
4) USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
For launching impersonation attack, let suppose the adversary A intercepts the request message {NID i , H 1 , G i , t 1 } and tries to impersonate U i . In this case the attacker must have access to the server secret key x s in order to obtain (id ui r s ) by decrypting NID i , however, x s is only known to the server S. Also, the attacker requires id ui , X i , r u1 and a valid time stamp t 1 to compute the H 1 . Therefore, the proposed protocol is resilient to user impersonation attack.
5) SERVER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Similarly, if the adversary A intercepts the response message and tries to send a fabricated message to U i to impersonate the server. In this case the validity of the message is checked by the user U i using its time stamp. Suppose, A successfully computes the r s1 using the smart-card stored parameters. However, without a valid time stamp, the attacker fails to compute the H 2 . Eventually, U i identifies A by verifying
= H 2 . Consequently, the proposed protocol resilient to the server impersonation attack.
6) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In the proposed protocol, in Login and authentication phases, first, the server S authenticates the U i on receipt of the request message 
7) PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY
The two random numbers r u1 , r s1 are involved in creation of the session key that are only known to U i and S, respectively. Suppose, id ui and X i gets compromised, still it is impossible for A to acquire both the random numbers r u1 and r s1 . Moreover, even if the attacker A is successful in compromising one session key, still it is impossible for the attacker to compute the new session key as both randoms numbers are chosen randomly by the U i and S in each session. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides forward secrecy.
8) STOLEN VERIFIER ATTACKS
The proposed scheme creates or stores no verifier table in the server database. In case if there is a verifier table on the server database, an adversary having access to the server has the ability to retrieve the information from the verifier table and use it to impersonate a legitimate user. Hence, A tries to access and manipulate the server's verifier table [26] . On the other hand the proposed protocol stores no such verifier table on the server side, therefore, even an A with access to the server database is unable to obtain information of users' verifier. Hence, an adversary A is not capable of generating multiple Login requests in the network. Therefore, the proposed scheme withstands denial of service attack.
10) RESIST INSIDER ATTACK
The user U i in the registration phase of the proposed protocol, sends {id ui , pwd i } message to the server. The message contains the password that is protected by a one-way hash function as pwd i = h(id ui pw ui N i B i ), where N i is random number selected by U i . Since one-way hash functions are irreversible making it impossible for an insider to retrieve the password pw ui of the user and random number N i from this message. Therefore, the proposed protocol is protected against the insider attack.
11) SESSION KEY SECRECY
To set up a session key, the proposed protocol uses two random number r u1 and r s1 selected by the user U i and server S respectively and independently for every session. So, the exposure of one session key does not make it possible for the attacker A to derive a new session key. Therefore, secrecy of the session is well protected in the by the proposed protocol.
12) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
The proposed scheme provides mutual authentication between user and server. The user is authenticated through parameter H 1 = h(id ui ||X ||t 1 ||r u1 ). The computation of H 1 is requires to compute the secret parameter X i = h(id ui ||x s ) of the user. The parameter X is stored in smart card by encrypting it with user password and biometrics. Therefore, to compute X i , one requires the three factors including smart card, password and user biometrics. Hence, no adversary can compute X i resulting non-computation of H 1 without three factors pertaining to user. Any adversary acting as man in middle can not compute H 1 . Moreover, user authenticates the server using H 2 = h(r s1 ||X i ||id ui ||t 3 ). Similar to user part, the adversary again needs either X i or sever secret key x s to compute H 2 . Therefore, no adversary can act as server. Furthermore, the computation of session key sk ui = h(X i ||id ui ||r s1 ||r u1 ), which requires knowledge of user secret parameter X i as well as the random number r s1 , r u1 generated by each participat i.e server and user. These random numbers cannot be exposed to any adversary acting as man in middle. Therefore, the proposed scheme strongly resists man in middle attack.
B. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the security of the proposed protocol has been informally analyzed against all known attacks. It can be observed from the informal security analysis that the proposed protocol is protected against the known attacks. The analysis has been performed using a standard random oracle model (ROM). The formal analysis using ROM shows that the proposed protocol is provably secure. For this formal proof however, this article adopts similar model as presented in [9] , [32] - [34] .
Proof 1: Following are the oracles used in the formal security analysis of the proposed protocol:
• Reveal 1: This oracle will unconditional outcome of an input x from a one-way secure hash function Y = h(x).
• Reveal 2: This oracle will unconditional results the plain text p from cipher text C = E k (p) without the knowledge of shared symmetric key k. Theorem 1: Assuming that the h(.) one-way secure hash function and the symmetric encryption act as oracles. Then the proposed protocol REBAKAS is provably secure against an Adversary A, to obtained the identity id ui and the password pw ui of the user U i as well as the private key x s of the server, and sk the session key shared between the user U i and the server S.
An imaginary adversary A has been created to perform experiment EXP1 using the two oracles Reveal 1 and Reveal 2 against the proposed protocol. The probability of success of the arithmetic algorithm is defined as:
Advantage of A performed series of queries q re1 and q re2 in polynomial time t with Adv1 as the success ratio as shown below
Adv1
Hash,Ecdlp
If A successfully cracks the secure one-way hash function h(.) and get the plain text without the knowledge of shared symmetric key from C = E k (p). However, inverting a one-way has function is computationally infeasible and to derive the plain text from a symmetric operation without having a key. Hence, the proposed protocol is protected against the attacker A to derive/extract the id ui , pw ui , x s , and sk.
Theorem 2: Each user U i employes password from dictionary space of length |L|. Suppose l h refers to the outcome length of hash, whereas, P r refers to the introduced protocol for observing authentication. The Adversary A can launch various queries in polynomial time t. These queries include: Send query as q s , Execute query as q e and hash query as q h . The advantage of A as PA can be substantiated as follows:
The proof is elaborated with a flurry of games such as G 1 to G 3 . The necessary assumptions are as follows: An event Suc i refers to the correct guess of A during G i effectively in Test. With respect to the demand of our model, A is not supposed to determine the identity of user due to assumption of single user. The games for specifying proof are delineated as follows:
Game G 1 : Within random oracle model it is observed as real protocol. Where, we choose randomly flipped coin value as . We have realized that the advantage of A to successfully predict is as under:
Game G 2 : All oracles are executed against respective queries. Then a list is also maintained to observe the record (Rec, r) after executing the query given in security model. The hash query checks the record (Rec, r) to find any list, if it is found r is returned otherwise r as random value is returned to the A. From A's perspective G 1 and G 2 are indistinguishable through simulation, therefore,
Game G 3 : During G − 3, few collisions are avoided, which is terminated when few collision occur over values (G i , m 2 ) along-with hash outcome. As r u1 , r s1 ∈ [1, p − 1], where the length of each hash value is l h . Keeping in view the birthday paradox, then maximum collision probability for respective hash oracles is . Therefore, we have:
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS WITH PROVERIF Security protocol are passed through verification to check if the protocol is immune to malicious attackers. Various tools are being used for verification of security protocols like AVISP, Skyther, and ProVerif etc. One tool that has been widely accepted for verification of security protocols is ProVerif [35] . It is used to check the resistance of a protocol against attacks, protection of privacy, and session key leakage. ProVerif is based on the famous pi calculus having ability to support various cryptographic operations. The proposed protocol has also been formally analyzed with ProVerif tool to check its immunity against attacks, privacy and secret key leakage. The ProVerif code is with three parts are shown in Figure 3 that session key secrecy is maintained. Therefore, Proposed scheme is secure under ProVerif attack model.
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Now that the security of the proposed protocol has been established formally and informally, it is time to analyze the protocol for performance in computation and communication. Here the proposed protocol has not only been analyzed for performance considering computation and communication overhead, but also been compared with existing state-of-the-art protocols including [23] , [27] , [28] , [36] . Computation cost of the proposed and existing protocols has been computed using the number of operations times their frequency executed in one transaction of the protocol, whereas communication cost has been computed using the number of bit exchanged during one transaction of the protocol. For the sake of performance evaluation, only the registration and authentication phases are discussed. Following are the notation used to represent the cryptographic operations:
• t oh : Computation time of a secure one-way hash function Recently, Kilinc and Yanik [37] in their survey paper mentioned that the running time for executing a hash function t oh is approximately 0.0023 ms and symmetric encryption/decryption t E s is approximately 0.0046 ms. Furthermore, according to Kilinc and Yanik, XOR and inverse operation are negligible in performance computation due to their insignificant execution time. The performance comparison has been shown in the Table 2 of the proposed protocol with recent related protocol presented in [23] , [27] , [28] , [36] .
This comparison has been pictorially depicted in FIGURE 4. It can be clearly seen from the Tables and Figures both that the proposed protocol has about 25% additional overhead in comparison to the Omid et al. protocol in case of computation cost, however, it is more secure as compared to rest of the schemes.
Similarly, Table 3 shows a comparison on the basis of communication cost using the number of messages exchanged in Login and authentication phases. Before proceeding ahead, it should be noted that the output of a one-way hash function and the length of a random number are 160 bits each and the length of the time stamp is 32 bits, whereas the lenght of the user identity is also 160 bits.
From Table 3 it can be observed that in the proposed protocol, three messages are exchanged where the Login message {NID i , H 1 , G i , t 1 } is equivalent to (160 + 160 + 160 + 32) = 512 − bits whereas the authentication message {m 2 , H 2 , NID new , t 3 } and {H 3 } is equivalent (160 + 160 + 160 + 32 + 160) = 672 − bits. So in total, the proposed scheme exchanges 1184 bits. The communication cost of related schemes has been shown in Table 3 . The communication cost of the proposed protocol in comparison to existing protocols has been depicted in FIGURE. the existing protocols. However, in terms of the number of bits exchanged during one transaction of the protocol, the proposed protocol has some additional overhead. The additional overhead is acceptable as it is leveraged to improve the security.
The proposed protocol has been comparatively analyzed using different security parameters. The comparison is presented in Table 4 where the table demonstrates the summarized security parameter comparison of the proposed protocol with the protocols presented in [23] , [27] , [28] , [36] . Results show that the proposed protocol provides all the security features whereas its counterparts lacks some of the features. For example, compared to other related schemes the proposed protocol provides user anonymity and also resists user impersonation attack. It was observed to be successful in providing all the security features whereas none of its counterparts has been able to do so.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study, an investigation of security lapses in Omid et al.'s scheme has been performed and found that their protocol is exposed to an impersonation attack and also unable to protect user identity. Therefore, a robust and efficient scheme has been proposed to counter the issues of Omid et al.'s scheme. It has been shown through formal and informal analysis that the proposed protocol is provably secure against all possible attacks, including user impersonation and user anonymity attacks. The proposed protocol has also been compared with related state-of-the-art protocols on the basis of security requirements, computational and communication complexity where the proposed protocol presents superior results in terms of security and robustness. Hence, the proposed protocol is appropriate for TMIS.
